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America's rich and varied dissenting traditions 
have been profoundly marked by a millennial 
vision that anticipates the creation of a new, more 
perfect society as the very fulfillment of Ameri-
ca's national destiny. In 1776, when Thomas Paine 
penned Common Sense, the singular pamphlet that 
gave voice to the revolutionary expectations of so 
many Americans in that turbulent year, he urged 
the people to overthrow the British monarchy in 
the name of a common fraternity and proclaimed, 
in a sentence now famous for its intense imagery: 
"We have it in our power to begin the world over 
again." 
Although Paine was his era's quintessential sec-
ular humanist, the millennial tones throughout 
Common Sense echoed another American cultural 
tradition as well. In his call for the creation of a 
new world, and in the Biblical language that per-
meated the pamphlet, Paine's message reflected, if 
not necessarily his, then the culture's deep reli-
gious ethos. As far back as the settlement of the 
Massachusetts Bay Colony in 1630, when John 
Winthrop delivered his sermon to those immi-
grants before they disembarked in Boston harbor, 
a yearning for spiritual regeneration intertwined 
itself with a particular faith in the colony as an 
instrument of God's will. In what is perhaps the 
oldest and most lasting metaphor defining Ameri-
can identity, Winthrop proclaimed that if his peo-
ple honored their sacred covenant with their God, 
then "we shall be as a city upon the hill, the eyes of 
all the world upon us." 
Paine's millennial views also foreshadowed 
those of generations yet to come although he, of 
course, could not have known that. The wide-
spread religious revivals of the early decades of 
the nineteenth century led many to claim their per-
sonal salvation and simultaneously to dedicate 
themselves to achieving the nation's salvation as 
well. The conviction that the Kingdom of God 
could be realized on this earth, if only we might 
cleanse the nation of sin, fueled efforts at abolition 
and many other reform causes. So deeply did this 
religious impulse permeate American reform 
efforts, that, for many, the distinction between the 
religious and the secular became quite blurred. 
John Winthrop's fear that, if his people did not 
keep their spiritual covenant with God, "We shall 
surely perish out of the good land wither we pass 
over this vast.sea to possess it," receded in the 
minds of those Americans increasingly bent on 
creating a decidedly secular New Jerusalem. 
In the expectations of a Eugene Victor Debs, 
searching for the promised land in the socialist 
revolution he believed would fulfill the potential 
of 1776, one can see a secular millennialism that 
touched many. In an odd fashion, the technologi-
cal millennialism of a Frederick W. Taylor, the 
promoter of scientific management, derived from a 
different yet recognizably common vision. Indeed, 
in the experiences of the Knights of Labor, the 
Industrial Workers of the World, and the initial 
organizers of the Congress of Industrial Organiza-
tions, this adaptation of the American millennial 
prospect continued. The most famous 
anthem of both the American left and 
the American labor movement 
throughout the twentieth century 
captured this continuity poignantly. 
In the words of the last stanza of 
"Solidarity Forever," written in 1915 
by Ralph Chaplin, an IWW organiz-
er, generations of American dis-
senters have proclaimed with reli-
gious fervor and a decidedly secular 
conviction that "We can bring to 
birth a new world from the ashes of 
the old/ For the union makes us 
strong." 
The American labor movement has 
fallen on hard times since it reached 
its pinnacle of strength in the mid-
1950s, and it never approached the 
messianic end Chaplin and so many 
others envisioned. Yet the millennial 
impulse so integral to the American 
experience did not therefore disap-
pear. During the 1960s, for example, 
expectations of a profound restructuring of 
American life again dominated the politics 
and the aspirations of a significant number 
of Americans. But unlike earlier moments 
in this tradition, this sense of engagement 
in pursuit of social justice was largely 
identified with that decade's youth. It was 
not that youth had been uninvolved in ear-
lier movements, or that people over thirty 
were idle in the 1960s — think, for exam-
ple, of Ella Baker, Martin Luther King, 
David Dellinger, Dorothy Cotton, or 
Staughton Lynd, to name but a few influen-
tial "adults" active during that decade. 
Rather, in the 1960s, what was notable was 
the number of young people who flocked 
to organizations founded by their peers that 
were critical of contemporary American 
life. That political impulse, inseparable 
from a wide-ranging cultural challenge to 
the official mores of a more staid America, 
defined the decade as one of youthful 
rebellion in both the mass media and in the 
inner eye of many activists themselves. 
From the picture of those four black stu-
dents occupying the Wool worth's counter 
in Greensboro, North Carolina in February 
1960 to the pain-wracked image of a young 
woman pleading with the heavens over the 
body of a dead Kent State student in 1970, 
the decade seemed defined by its youthful 
dissenters. In 1960, the largely black Stu-
dent Non-Violent Coordinating Committee 
(SNCC) emerged from Reverend King's 
adult ministerial alliance to affirm nonvio-
lence, emphasize the importance of local 
community involvement in ending segrega-
tion, and to assert that the "redemptive 
community supersedes immoral social sys-
tems." Two years later, the largely white 
Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), 
itself an offshoot of an older social-democ-
ratic organization, released a founding 
statement written at Port Huron, Michigan. 
Insisting on the individual human potential 
they held contemporary society smothered, 
and proclaiming the need for a genuine par-
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ticipatory democracy to restructure Amer-
ican society, these student radicals wrote: 
"We are people of this generation, bred in 
at least modest comfort, housed now in 
universities, looking uncomfortably to the 
world we inherit." The chasm that would 
grow between the two movements, as 
potent fantasies of black power revolution-
aries and white guerrilla warriors careened 
crazily against each other and the police, 
was still in the future and, in 1964, it was 
yet possible to envision joint effort across 
racial and even class divides in construct-
ing the desired new world. 
That, at least, was the message of Mario 
Savio, the passionate intellectual student 
leader at the University of California, 
Berkeley, who fired this mix of ideas into 
their purest form: "America is becoming 
even more the Utopia of sterilized, auto-
mated contentment," Savio stated that 
year, after returning from a stint with 
SNCC in Mississippi. "The 'futures' and 
'careers' for which American students 
now prepare are for the most part intellec-
tual and moral wastelands. This chrome-
plated consumer's paradise would have us 
grow up to be well-behaved children. 
But," Savio insisted, in an expression that 
caught the essence of these emerging stu-
dent radicals, "an important minority of 
men and women coming to the front today 
have shown that they will die rather than 
be standardized, replaceable and irrele-
vant." 
The path from SNCC's "redemptive 
community" or Savio's moral minority to 
the paranoid fantasies of violent revolution 
in the late 1960s is strewn with the frac-
tured expectations of the Civil Rights 
movement and the growing outcry against 
the Vietnam War. But what was common 
for this generation of activists across the 
era's tumultuous divisions lay less in their 
specific actions than in the fundamental 
principles of their critique of American 
society. A testy dismissal of adult 
"hypocrisy" in not living up to American 
ideals quickly grew into a total attack on 
American liberalism and the political cul-
ture it spawned. Liberalism was structural-
ly flawed, SNCC organizers in Mississippi 
came to argue, for there was no mecha-
nism by which non-elites could counter 
the concentrated economic and political 
influence wielded by the white establish-
ment. SDS activists, on campus and in the 
few urban organizing projects they started, 
came to similar conclusions. Even the 
labor movement, long considered by the 
American left as the crucial vehicle for 
any serious reform, to say nothing of revo-
lution, was dismissed as hopelessly com-
promised, fatally attracted to a politically 
enervating materialism, and rendered 
impotent as an agent of change by its inter-
nal hierarchical and race-conscious struc-
tures. Above all, liberalism was corrupt, a 
morally suspect system that under the 
guise of providing for a common good 
was in fact organized around achieving 
the self-interest of the powerful. 
As these components of what would 
become a New Left critique developed, 
the movement turned, with perhaps less 
confidence, to projecting the outlines of 
the society that would replace failed liber-
alism. At the core was the concept of par-
ticipatory democracy, that individuals 
would organize in their given communi-
ties largely without outside interference 
and define for themselves their aspirations 
and the principles by which they would 
achieve them. If, as James Tracy has sug-
gested in his book, Direct Action, partici-
patory democracy proved of limited bene-
fit the less internally cohesive and com-
pact a group of citizens were, that was a 
point not yet understood by these student 
activists. Indeed, grassroots organizing, 
the political tool essential to participatory 
democracy, became a catch-all slogan, 
perhaps especially among those who had 
not spent life-threatening days of raw ten-
sion trying to do just that. Out of this mix, 
it was hoped, the people themselves 
would define the parameters of the new 
society that would emerge. 
Variations on this story have dominated 
public discussions of the period. While 
there have been disagreements, at times 
bitter, among authors concerning the apt-
ness of past tactics, strategy, and guiding 
principles of various groups, all agree the 
real story of the era rests with the youthful 
dissenters and their struggle with the lib-
eral political system. This is true for the 
best of the works such as James Miller's 
Democracy is in the Streets, or Todd 
Gitlin's The Sixties: Years of Hope, Days 
of Rage, as it is for the numerous docu-
mentary readers that define the decade 
solely from the perspective of the New 
Left activists. There is even now some-
thing of a cottage industry in the academ-
ic journals, dissertations, and books that 
assert a continuity of principle and prac-
tice by former activists despite the fate of 
the New Left after 1970. The title of Lau-
ren Kessler's interesting volume captures 
this spirit perfectly: After All These Years: 
Sixties Ideals in a Different World. 
But, one might wonder, what is that dif-
ferent world and how did it come about? 
Was the New Left a premature revolution, 
the fruits of which must await a future set 
of proper conditions to develop? Or was it 
more a victim of a giant government con-
spiracy that crushed a vibrant and grow-
ing oppositional tendency? Adherents of 
these and similar interpretations thus can 
explain the demise of the New Left while 
protecting its image as a tribune of a peo-
ple in inevitable, if slow, political motion. 
But a perspective less protective of the 
New Left might reveal more. Perhaps 
treatments of that era have never fully cap-
tured either the complex turnings of Amer-
ica's political and religious history or the 
complete portrait of dissident youth during 
and after that decade. The importance of 
John A. Andrew's recent book, The Other 
Side of the Sixties: Young Americans for 
Freedom and the Rise of Conservative 
Politics, is that he attempts to understand 
how the new, different world of the quar-
tek-century since 1970 in fact emerged 
from, if not the ashes, then the fissures of 
the old. 
Andrew, a professor of history at 
Franklin and Marshall College, takes as 
his starting point the rather simple propo-
sition that SNCC and SDS were not alone 
among the important youth groups with 
roots in the 1960s. While those two groups 
garnered most of the newspaper coverage, 
underscoring once again the symbiotic 
relationship between youthful dissidents 
and the mass media locked in an increas-
ingly sensational search for "good copy," 
there was yet a third group of major politi-
cal significance with origins in that 
decade. Young Americans for Freedom 
(YAF), a hierarchically structured group 
with a decidedly buttoned-down self-
image, helped spawn the most far-reaching 
and fundamental transformation of Ameri-
can political life of any of the dissident 
youth groups. The image should not 
obscure the key fact: they considered 
themselves dissenters who possessed a 
serious critique of, and the outlines of an 
alternative to, contemporary American lib-
eralism and its political culture. 
On September 9, 1960, 97 college-age 
men and women gathered at Great Elms, 
the family estate of William F. Buckley, 
Jr., in Sharon, Connectk it. Buckley was 
already a conservative tninker of national 
< A F E D E W I T T 
repute, having authored two books (God 
and Man at Yale and Up From Liberalism) 
during the previous decade and founded the 
leading conservative political weekly, 
National Review. While Buckley and other 
older conservatives such as William Rusher 
and M. Stanton Evans played important 
roles in organizing young conservatives, 
the group that met at Great Elms very much 
defined itself generationally: "In this time 
of moral and political crisis," the Sharon 
Statement, YAF's founding document 
began, "it is the responsibility of the youth 
of America to affirm certain eternal truths." 
If the prologue eerily foreshadowed the 
moral tones of the Port Huron Statement, 
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what followed was far briefer and diamet-
rically different in philosophical and polit-
ical orientation. "[A]s young conserva-
tives," the founders identified "the indi-
vidual's use of his God-given free will" as 
the "foremost among the transcendent val-
ues" to be honored and protected, for that 
guaranteed the individual's right to be 
"free from the restrictions of arbitrary 
force." YAF extolled a concept of govern-
ment limited to preserving order and liber-
ty; affirmed the essential unity of political 
and economic freedoms; and proclaimed 
the market economy as the most compati-
ble "with the requirements of personal 
freedom and constitutional government" 
even as it remains "the most productive 
supplier of human needs." Not surprising-
ly, government interference in the opera-
tion of the economy, be it by the liberal 
state at home or by a communist govern-
ment abroad, was condemned; and interna-
tional Communism identified as the 
"greatest single threat" to American liber-
ty-
This emphasis on individual freedom as 
the source of liberty served notice that 
YAF had a different philosophical premise 
than did the other major student groups. 
The fountainhead of liberty required pro-
tection precisely because it could be tram-
pled by the forces of evil. For these con-
servative youth, to search for the secular 
millennium on earth was to avoid the cen-
tral problem of human evil. Many of them 
traced their understanding of this human 
dilemma back to St. Augustine's Confes-
sions, and they reacted with a scorn 
touched with real dismay at their 
liberal/left opponents' attempts to con-
struct the perfect society with such flawed 
material. If at times they might reduce a 
complex understanding of human nature to 
an anti-communist shibboleth, it was also 
true that their deeply grounded emphasis 
on man's sinful nature had unexpected 
political consequences. In the post-1945 
decades, as this society embraced what is 
arguably its fourth major period of reli-
gious revival, that more somber theologi-
cal and political tone provided these young 
conservatives with access to many Ameri-
cans who, touched by the burgeoning Pen-
tecostal and evangelical religious move-
ments, had themselves restructured their 
moral lives through a profound conversion 
experience. In time they too came to 
search for,an America that reflected their 
deepest beliefs. 
Not surprisingly, the philosophical 
chasm that separated conservative youth 
from their liberal/left peers had its practi-
cal meaning as well. Where the emerging 
student radicals of the left protested the 
anti-Communist hearings conducted by 
the House Un-American Activities Com-
mittee and the governmental demand that 
university teachers sign loyalty oaths, con-
servative students formed the National 
Student Committee for the Loyalty Oath 
and praised FBI Director, J. Edgar Hoover* 
for his vigilance against communism. The 
most important practical difference, how-
ever, had less to do with particular politi-
cal positions than with a fundamental dif-
ference over how each might transform 
American society. Where the liberal/left 
students came to embrace participatory 
democracy, community organizing, and 
massive demonstrations in their effort to 
restructure American politics, conserva-
tives from the very beginning applauded 
the constitutional foundations of American 
political culture but sought to control its 
direction according to their own lights. In 
short, they appreciated the sources of 
political power and saw little need to 
devise new forms of political process. 
For the students who would create YAF, 
the source of political power lay within the 
Republican party. From their point of 
view, the party had lost its moorings in the 
deluge of New Deal liberalism and in the 
exigencies of a world war. The long-
held demand for limited government 
and for a religiously-based moral order 
that provided a defense of tradition and 
a critique of contemporary secular and 
materialistic society — the core of a 
conservative critique for more than a 
century — seemed to them dismissed in 
the claim of the Eisenhower Republican 
party that it stood for a "modern Repub-
licanism." To what was then a rump 
caucus within the party, President 
Eisenhower's view that the American 
people "are going to demand that the 
government do something to give them 
an opportunity to live out a satisfactory 
life" indicated to conservatives of all 
ages just how irrelevant were their prin-
ciples to both parties as then constitut-
ed: liberty itself was threatened when 
the leader of the party of ideological 
conservatism so easily projected such 
an expanded role for government. To 
such a conservative, the threat of com-
munism was even more sinister. For 
conservatives young and old, commu-
nism was indeed the anti-Christ — the 
very antithesis of their understanding of 
liberty and freedom — which could 
only be vanquished, not reformed. So 
pronounced was this battle imagery and 
so suspicious was any appeal for 
expanded government, that many 
thought the Eisenhower administration 
was, however unwittingly, little more 
than a Trojan horse that bore within it 
the virulent seeds of socialist disorder. 
From within such a world view there 
could be no millennium before 
Armageddon. 
So the conservative students conduct-
ed grassroots organizing on campus and 
within the Republican party. No office, 
however insignificant it seemed when 
framed against national politics, was too 
minor to contest; and the endless rounds of 
knocking on doors in assembly districts 
and campus dorms yielded results even 
before YAF formed. By 1959, conserva-
tive Republican students and their adult 
allies largely dominated the Young Repub-
lican apparatus within the party, and they 
mounted a vigorous campaign to have 
Barry Goldwater, the United States Sena-
tor from Arizona, nominated as Richard 
Nixon's vice-presidential candidate in 
1960. While they failed in this, as they did 
in pressuring Nixon to embrace conserva-
tive principles, the effort did create a 
national, self-consciously conservative, 
student network. Thus the call for the 
Sharon conference stressed the importance 
of broadening the campus-based conserva-
tive youth movement and orientated those 
students toward action on and off the cam-
pus. "By action," the call to meeting insist-
ed, "we mean political actionl" John F. 
Kennedy, of course, beat Nixon in 1960 
but as the Republican standardbearer was 
never the candidate of the conservative 
youth, they saw in his defeat an internal 
power vacuum that might allow them 
another opportunity to transform the 
Republican party itself. Although the con-
servative movement was anything but uni-
fied — indeed, its early organizational his-
tory reads surprisingly familiar to anyone 
who has plowed through discussions of left 
factional fights in this country —it's mem-
bers did share a common goal nonetheless: 
to capture the 1964 Republican presiden-
tial nomination. 
In the four years following Nixon's loss 
to Kennedy, two older men remained 
instrumental in the conservative move-
ment's growth even as the students contin-
ued their organizing. If Goldwater's failed 
nomination as vice-president had galva-
nized the students, the January 1960 publi-
cation of Conscience of a Conservative 
defined a political faith for that era. While 
liberals snickered that L. Brent Bozell, a 
conservative writer, had ghostwritten the 
book (they had yet to discover that John F. 
Kennedy's 1956 Pulitzer prize-winning 
Profiles in Courage was the effort of a 
poorly paid and later ignored writer), Con-
science of a Conservative was a bestseller. 
In it Goldwater explained the moral and 
political principles of the conservative 
faith in a rather direct fashion. Centralized 
government undermined individual liberty, 
he wrote, and violated the "legitimate func-
tions of government [that] are actually con-
ducive to freedom": the maintenance of 
domestic order; protection from foreign 
foes; administration of justice; and 
"removing obstacles to the free exchange 
of goods." Written in an accessible style 
that reflected Goldwater's public speech, 
the book almost immediately fulfilled the 
author's goal. "Our objective," Goldwater 
wrote a conservative friend in January 
1960, "is to take the onus from the word 
'Conservative' and make it acceptable to 
people who shy away from it today.... If 
[we] can do this in a philosophical way, 
then we can attach the definitions and 
expositions to the concrete subjects of leg-
islation." From the perspective of almost 
forty years later, Goldwater's effort yield-
ed an immense harvest. 
The second major figure guiding the 
young conservatives was William F. Buck-
ley. Too erudite and viciously witty for 
practical politics, Buckley acted as the 
intellectual catalyst whose books and arti-
cles, television shows, and independent 
political action (he ran for mayor of New 
York City in 1964, and in losing helped 
establish the Conservative party as a factor 
in state politics) gave the conservative 
cause intellectual respectability and recog-
nition. Buckley was especially popular 
among young, college-educated conserva-
tives. As Patrick Buchanan remembered, 
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talking of his days as a youthful Goldwater 
supporter: 
It is difficult to exaggerate the debt conser-
vatives of my generation owe National 
Review and Bill Buckley. Before I read NR, 
there was virtually nothing I read that sup-
ported or reinforced what I was coming to 
believe....For us, what National Review did 
was take the word conservatism, then a 
synonym for stuffy, orthodoxy, Republican 
stand-pat-ism and economic self-interest, 
and conyert it into the snapping pennant of 
a fighting faith. 
To have his ideas so influence even the 
grubbiness of electoral politics remains no 
small accomplishment for the Yale-educat-
ed, patrician son of an elite Connecticut 
family. 
By 1964, the efforts of Goldwater, Buck-
ley, and the hundreds of original YAF 
activists had produced tangible results. 
YAF claimed some 350 chapters nation-
wide, with a membership of approximately 
30,000. (SDS, in 1963, claimed 750 mem-
bers.) While no one could check those fig-
ures, both Irving Howe and Michael Har-
rington, socialists and incisive critics of 
conservatism, confirmed in separate 1962 
articles that conservative students, while 
still a minority, were increasingly impor-
tant on college campuses. Who, then, were 
these students? According to Andrew, who 
relied on a 1966 study of 120 YAF 
activists, the answers might have surprised 
students in SDS. YAF members came from 
families they themselves defined as strict 
and hierarchically structured, where par-
ents were Republicans or Independents (of 
whom only 6.3% identified with the radical 
right), and which were predominately 
working class. Significantly, a third were 
from Catholic families, a figure consider-
ably higher than SDS's 9.6% or even the 
Young Republicans' 19.2% of members 
from Catholic households. Without setting 
out to do it, YAF assembled among its 
early activists representatives of precisely 
the demographic and ideological groupings 
that would largely revolutionize American 
politics over the ensuing three decades. It 
was a lesson that, as they grew into their 
majority, the liberal/left students would 
deeply regret they did not heed themselves. 
At first, however, just the opposite 
seemed the case. Thanks in no small part to 
the efforts of conservative youth, Goldwa-
ter won the 1964 Republican presidential 
nomination in an astounding rout of the 
Republican moderates. In control of much 
of the party machinery, a result of those 
long hours of grassroots organizing, con-
servatives cheered wildly as Goldwater 
proclaimed in his acceptance speech that 
"extremism in the defense of liberty is no 
vice" and that "moderation in the pursuit of 
justice is no virtue." The enthusiasm soon 
waned as Lyndon Johnson won all but six 
states, defeating Goldwater by some 16 
million votes. But where political oppo-
nents saw in the defeat conservatism's final 
curtain call, conservatives themselves wit-
nessed only the end of the first act. The 
basic problem Goldwater and his support-
ers had encountered, F. Clifton White, a 
conservative Republican, wrote in an elec-
tion post-mortem, was that "in the latter 
half of the twentieth century practically 
everyone wanted, indeed expected, some-
thing from the government.... [Thus] Lyn-
don Johnson was a conservative defending 
the established order while Barry Goldwa-
ter, the true conservative, became a 'radi-
cal' bent on upsetting the applecart of 
peace and plenty." For conservatives, then, 
the question became how to learn to "birth 
a new world from the ashes of the old." 
Unfortunately, but understandably, The 
Other Side of the Sixties essentially stops 
with the 1964 election. In his detailed 
examination of the factional battles within 
YAF, and between YAF and other 
extremely conservative groups such as the 
John Birch Society and the Minutemen, 
John Andrew explains and analyzes with 
clarity and purpose. We learn much as well 
about YAF's critique of the New Deal 
legacy concerning labor law and social 
security, and we come to understand some-
thing of the consistency in political philos-
ophy in some of the more honorable con-
servative politicians and thinkers. In a sug-
gestive but limited final chapter, Andrew 
sketches the legacy of YAF's early years, 
noting that it was there, in the Goldwater 
struggle, that future leaders of American 
conservatism such as Buchanan, Richard 
Viguerie, and Howard Phillips cut their 
political teeth. But more is needed, for the 
impact of this conservative youthful 
activism has gone 
well beyond its per-
sonal meaning for a 
handful of partici-
pants. 
In 1961, for exam-
ple, when he wrote 
Revolt on the 
Campus, M. Stanton 
Evans may have been 
excused for his parti-
san enthusiasm when 
he proclaimed that 
"historians may well 
record the decade of 
the 1960s as the era in 
which conservatism, 
as a viable political 
force, finally came 
into its own" For 
most people at the 
time student activists 
were identified with a 
decidedly liberal/left 
politics. From the per-
spective^of the 1990s, however, what 
demands explanation is precisely that 
Evans' prophecy has become such a com-
monplace, while the New Left has long lost 
political meaning. 
To understand this transformation one 
must take seriously both the ideological 
and social meaning of the conservative 
movement. For all their internal dissension, 
conservatives as a group have been able to 
appeal to American voters because their 
ideas resonate deeply in this culture. Theirs 
is a language of individualism, of protect-
ing freedom from incursions by powerful 
elites accountable only to themselves, and 
it is at its core a language of patriotism. Irv-
ing Howe appreciated something of the 
power of this message when he wrote 
almost forty years ago that in the conserva-
tive students' "concern for the preservation 
of personal initiative in a bureaucratic soci-
ety there is something an intelligent radical 
ought to accept." While some conserva-
tives became at times paranoid in their fear 
of communist subversion, the history of 
opposition to the state in the former Soviet 
Union suggests the dimensions of the prob-
lem Howe alluded to. More to the point, the 
conservative defense of individual liberty 
reflected a major strain of American politi-
cal culture. While the political conse-
quences were indeed different if one 
invoked Thomas Jefferson, John C. Cal-
houn, Ralph Waldo Emerson, or Horatio 
Alger as a nineteenth-century antecedent, 
each could nonetheless lead a twentieth-
century activist into conservative thought. 
The transformation of those idealistic 
YAFers in the 1960s into the enormously 
successful and far more pragmatic conserv-
ative political operatives of the 1980s is 
precisely what needs analysis. 
The social meaning of the movement 
bears attention as well. While much of the 
student left (with copious media encour-
agement) indulged itself with the expecta-
tion that, during its decade of the 1960s, it 
would "begin the world over again," others 
experienced a quite different era. Imagine, 
for example, a Chicago kid, age 12 in 1956, 
attending the local Catholic parochial 
school, the grandchild of immigrants from 
Central or Eastern Europe, working-class 
or perhaps the son of a working-class 
father now a member of the white-collar, 
lower -middle class. For such a person, 
the political awakening of his decade may 
have begun in 1956, with fervent prayers 
at school and at home over the failed Hun-
garian Revolution and the fate of Catholic 
Hungary's beloved Jozsef Cardinal Mind-
szenty. It may also have ended in 1968 
when Russian tanks crushed Prague's 
Spring. From this perspective, the New 
Left's disruption of the Democratic 
National Convention in Chicago in the 
summer of 1968 was anything but a liber-
ating experience, especially if Vietnam 
had touched this imagined kid now grown 
to adulthood. Ethnicity, religion and class, 
nurtured in the inter-
twined networks of 
an urban neighbor-
hood developed over 
the critical develop-
mental years in an 
individual's life, 
more often than not 
moved such "kids" 
away from the poli-
tics of the student 




played a role, of 
course, in creating a 
conservative move-
ment among young 
people. Some were 
attracted by the patri-
otism of the move-
ment, by the fierce 
commitment to anti-
communism. But oth-
ers, especially from working-class and 
poor families, also watched with growing 
anger as more New Left activists than 
now care to remember quietly signed the 
papers or took the tests to gain a student 
deferment from the military draft. Largely 
without those options, it was the black and 
white working-class kids who answered 
the government's call and suffered the 
consequences. In the moral language of 
the era, it was the hypocrisy of those lib-
eral/left students that helped prepare 
many a white working-class youth for the 
conservative cause. 
Finally, race played a central role in 
expanding the conservative movement. In 
part, many in the white, urban working 
class resented enormously liberal politi-
cians manipulation of school redistricting, 
for example, which preserved the isola-
tion of the more elite suburban districts 
while forcing urban schools into fierce 
racial and class conflicts. In Anthony 
Lukas' Common Ground, Jim Sleeper's 
The Closest of Strangers, and Jonathan 
Rieder's Canarsie: The Jews and Italians 
of Brooklyn Against Liberalism, the 
movement of white working people away 
from a liberalism experienced as a forced, 
elite-driven, social experiment is evident; 
and conservatives quickly capitalized on 
the opportunity to bring into their fold 
these working-class, New Deal Democ-
rats. Thus the phenomenon of the "Rea-
gan Democrats" during and after the 
1980s, and the simply stunning New York 
Times exit poll result that showed, for the 
1984 presidential election, that nearly 
40% of identified trade union voters chose 
to re-elect Ronald Reagan — this after the 
PATCO strike, Solidarity Day, and an 
intense anti-Reagan drive by the unions 
themselves. 
But conservatives were not simply 
opportunists, corralling voters where they 
could in the manner of politicians 
throughout the democratic world. As early 
as 1964, Ralph de Toledano, a conserva-
tive writer and activist, argued that the 
message of Goldwater's defeat was in fact 
the breakup of the New Deal coalition. 
Goldwater had taken five southern states, 
largely due to white anger over civil 
rights, and conservatives sought to capi-
talize on that fissure. By 1968, conserva-
tive analyst Kevin Phillips developed for 
the first Nixon campaign a formal "south-
ern strategy," which consciously pitched 
its political message to attract those 
whites resentful at the "gains" African 
Americans made in ending American seg-
regation. This was quickly adapted by the 
conservative movement in general. 
Unwilling, following Goldwater's defeat, 
to publicly stand for dismantling major 
portions of the New Deal government, 
conservatives instead merged the twin 
images of welfare cheats and black Amer-
icans into a potent racial appeal. In a con-
sistent thirty-year effort, conservatives 
have successfully belittled Lyndon John-
son's Great Society legislation, particular-
ly its welfare and civil rights provisions. 
That may be "fair" in politics, but intrinsic 
to that process was the demonization of 
black men and women as "welfare 
queens," hustlers, and shiftless, irrespon-
sible people. Thus Goldwater's consistent 
(if wrongheaded) position in favor of full 
civil rights for black Americans without 
increased governmental action had degen-
erated within a decade into an ugly manip-
ulation of the worst elements in human 
nature. That this was done on behalf of a 
cause so philosophically sensitive to the 
problem of good and evil in human expe-
rience makes even greater the burden of 
responsibility conservatives carry for the 
consequences of such destructive behav-
ior. 
In an ironic way, 1960s student radicals 
of both the left and.the right actually 
achieved part of their goals. Liberalism, as 
a widely-shared political vision that 
addressed common goals for a great num-
ber of Americans, barely limped out of the 
decade. Yet it remains unclear what has 
taken its place. The New Deal coalition no 
longer exists, but the "Reagan Revolu-
tion" itself has devolved into a two-term 
Clinton presidency. American politics has 
shifted demonstrably to the right, with 
limited government, balanced budgets, 
and welfare reform prominent in the polit-
ical rhetoric of politicians of both parties. 
Yet voters fail to turn out for either party 
in near-record numbers every four years. 
Contributing to the state of our civic life 
has been the revival of religion, perhaps 
the most widely-experienced American 
social movement in all of the twentieth 
century. For some, the power of their con-
version obliterates consideration of politi-
cal life, as the expectation of the coming 
glory dismisses all else before it. For oth-
ers, such as those in the Christian Coali-
tion, to be born-again is to become a sol-
dier of the Lord in the political as well as 
the religious realm. While conservatives 
have indeed gained in the short term from 
these developments, that gain may actual-
ly obscure a more fundamental process. 
As happened during revivals in earlier 
centuries, the process of religious rebirth 
is again accompanied by a sharp, even 
antagonistic, critique of existing religious 
leaders and institutions. 
That two of the basic structures of this 
society have been in such flux makes 
clearer the dimensions of the broad crisis 
of authority that has framed American life 
over the past three decades. The conserva-
tive "victory" is suspect, primarily 
because its adherents have been unable to 
consolidate it philosophically or political-
ly. Far more important than the politics of 
this group or that tactic is the possibility 
that this crisis of authority in American 
society may be the key to comprehending 
the legacy of the 1960s. 
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